Introduction
After decades of struggle, the rights of Aboriginal people of Australia over their illegally occupied land were finally recognized by the Native Title Act which was passed in 1993. Recognition of Native Title overturned the long-standing view that Australia was terra nullius -land belonging to no one. Earlier efforts in different states and territories had resulted in the granting of land to Aboriginal communities without specific recognition of Native Title. While this was hailed as a major milestone in the process of reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians, the operationalization of the Act was fraught with problems and uncertainties. As several Aboriginal communities discovered to their dismay, granting of Native Title did not always mean control of the land and its resources, especially when the clarion call of "national interest" was sounded. Tourism, the creation of national parks and mining interests were all enclosed under the rubric of national interest and in almost every case, Aboriginal interests were put last. This paper examines one such case: the Jabiluka uranium mine in the Northern Territory which was recently given the go-ahead signal by the Australian government despite protests by the Mirrar community, the traditional owners of the land, and by various national and international environmental groups including UNICEF.
I begin the paper with a critical discussion of the narratives of colonialism and postcolonialism. In particular, I interrogate the question of the "post" in relation to dominant first world theorizations of postcolonialism. I discuss the spatio-temporal inadequacies of this concept with reference to the struggle of indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada, the United States and South America and argue that the position of indigenous peoples in contemporary postcolonial theory continues to be unspeakable and invisible. I then discuss the historical conditions underlying the relations between mining interests and indigenous communities as well as the role of other stakeholders in this process and argue that current organization theories on managing stakeholders are complicit with colonialist attitudes and values. I then provide a history of the Jabiluka mine and examine the colonial and anti-colonial discourses that inform this project. In particular, I focus on the colonialist, capitalist discourse inherent in the construction of Australian nationhood and the management of Aboriginal identity. I examine the differential power dynamics among the different stakeholders in this process, a process that has been taking place over the last 20 years since permission to construct the Ranger mine was granted by the Australian government. I conclude by discussing the implications of colonial and anti-colonial discourse for critical management studies and provide some directions for future research.
Colonial and Postcolonial Dominations
The term "postcolonial", despite gaining currency in Western academic thought in recent years, is mired in much theoretical and political ambiguity (Shohat, 1992) . The prefix "post-" indicates the passing of an era, an era of colonial domination that ended with the emergence of newly independent nations in Asia, Africa, and South America. However, several scholars have questioned this assumption and in problematizing the postcolonial condition, have criticized the universalist definition of culture that informs it (Mani, 1989; Radhakrishnan, 1993) , doubted its political agency (Shohat, 1992) , critiqued its singularity and ahistoricity (McClintock, 1992; Prakash, 1992) and warned of its ability to reproduce politics of domination (Pugliese, 1995) .
Rather than attempt to trace a definition of postcolonialism with all its nuances, it might be more appropriate to refer to this school of thought as one that attempts to thematize and problematize issues arising from colonial relations (Shohat, 1992) . It is, to quote Edward Said, a "retrospective reflection on colonialism, the better to understand the difficulties of the present in newly independent states" (Said, 1986 p. 45) . Using the term "post" in postcolonialism is problematic, as several scholars have pointed out. It tends to isolate and dislocate the problems caused by colonialism and place them in some past era with the assumption that colonialism as a historical reality has somehow ended (Mani, 1989; Said, 1986) . Traces of colonialism in present "postcolonial" histories of new nation states are often obliterated or retraced in economic terms of "progress" and "development". It seems to distance itself somehow from neocolonialism by glib assertions of "giving priority to the lost, silenced, dispossessed 'other'" (Muecke, p.10 ) without speaking of its complicity in contemporary power relations (Shohat, 1992) . Thus, as Said (1986) points out, it absolves itself of any claims for present consequences of the damages caused by colonization.
Western representations of time have always been central on constructing Self-Other differences (Gupta, 1994) and the time-space assumptions of the prefix "post-" are no different in that they homogenize different histories and normalize inter-cultural differences. As McClintock (1992) has pointed out, this normalization process displaces political differences between postcolonial cultures to their temporal distance from European colonialism. This assumption of temporal distance has two problems: first, it obscures the continuing unevenness of power relations between colonizer and colonized in the present by prespecifying the path the former colonies must take -the path to "development", "progress" and "modernity", which of course continues the same uneven transfer of resources from the south to the north, this time using the economic machine instead of the military machine. The pernicious social, cultural and ecological consequences of this "catching up development" for Third World countries are well-documented (Escobar, 1995; Esteva, 1987; Mies and Shiva, 1993; Shiva, 1989) . Second, in its celebratory rhetoric, "post-"colonialism obscures historical, cultural and political differences between different countries by providing a fictitious "common past" that all postcolonial are supposed to sharetheir contact with Europe. Thus, in this temporal vector, an imperial power like the United States can qualify as being "postcolonial". Similarly, Argentina and Hong Kong, despite their very different past and present histories are both "postcolonial" as are Brazil and Zimbabwe (McClintock, 1992) . Contemporary postcolonial theory is especially problematic in accounting for anti-colonialist struggles such as the struggles of the peoples of the Fourth World to negotiate with and survive colonial conditions in countries like "postcolonial" Australia where Aboriginal peoples are consistently denied their rights.
The politics of domination in the case of indigenous peoples all over the world are shaped by discourses of nation-states (whether First, Second or Third World) or of globalization under the guise of transnational capitalism (Shohat, 1992) . The nexus between transnational capitalism and nation-states is no better exemplified than an event that occurred during the Australian Bicentennial celebrations of 1988: the main "celebration" involved the re-enactment of the arrival of the First Fleet in 1788 at Botany Bay, but this time the ships did not fly the Union Jack, rather their sails were appropriately emblazoned with the corporate logos of Coca Cola, Chase Corporation, Fuji Film, Mobil and other transnational firms. The fact that the Aboriginal population had not much reason to celebrate the occasion was another example of the historical amnesia that is characteristic of global colonialism (Castles et al. 1992 ). This exhibition of what McClintock (1992) calls "confetti triumphalism" is predicated on an erasure of the histories of indigenous peoples. The many cases of resistance against this "celebration" by several Aboriginal group was given short shrift by the media and dismissed as "unpatriotic and unAustralian". In a single celebratory step of the anniversary of a country, the injustices of the past were banished and the path toward a new "multicultural" Australia was set (Banerjee and Linstead, 1998) . This pattern is distinctively colonial in both its historical amnesia and notions of "egalitarianism" that set future agendas for "progress". As Said (1986) declares powerfully: "…(generalizations about the entire ex-colonial world) was accompanied by a whole set of appeals to an imagined history of one-way Western endowments and free hand outs followed by a reprehensible sequence of ungrateful bitings of that grandly giving "Western" hand… How easily is everything compressed into that simple formula of unappreciated magnanimity. Gone are the ravages to the colonial people who for centuries endured summary justice, unending economic oppression, the total distortion of their societies and their intimate lives, unending economic oppression, and a recourseless submission given to them as a function of unchanging European superiority. Gone are most of the traces that comprised the immensely detailed and violent history of colonial intervention". (p.46).
It is also important to realize that despite its focus on non-western spaces and locations, postcolonialism is rooted in Anglo-American academy and is "a discursive practice in the specific context of the western academy" (Pugliese, 1995, p. 345) . This discursive time-space encompasses the histories and cultures of a vast diversity of peoples, locating and viewing them from the privileged gaze of Western knowledge, however "post" or reflexive that knowledge is constructed to be. As Pugliese (1995) has pointed out, critiques of postcolonialism by postcolonial scholars are not necessarily conducted from external positions of privilege, but are implicated in the same cultural and institutional processes that are being critiqued. Within this discursive space, Pugliese (1995) doubts the possibility of developing a "disappropriative practice" in postcolonial theory because these practices "inscribe themselves on embodies subjects and that (re)produce the regulatory and disciplinary order of (neo)colonial regimes" (p. 347). Pugliese's position on the inability of postcolonial theory to produce an emancipatory reincscription of practices appears to be different from Bhabha's (1994) notion of hybriditythe creation of a space that overcomes the separation of colonizer and colonized, a space that permits the negotiation of antagonistic situations, often a space to situate present day struggles. This space is neither within nor outside or positioned in opposition to histories of colonial domination, rather it attempts in Spivakian terms, a "catachrestic reinscription: reversing, displacing, and seizing the apparatus of value-coding" (Spivak, 1990 , cited in Prakash 1992 .
It is significant that the geopolitical contexts where such emancipatory reinscriptions are taking place are defined mainly by North American and European theorizations of postcolonialism. The position of indigenous peoples in contemporary postcolonial theory continues to be unspeakable and invisible. As Perera and Pugliese (1998) have pointed out, these theories have very little relevance (and could in fact prove quite problematic) in accounting for ongoing struggles of indigenous people in Australia, Canada and the United States. In these societies, where much programmatic celebrations of "multiculturalism" occur regularly, there is often a conflation of indigenous rights with other "minority" issues with little acknowledgment that the agendas of these groups are quite different and often incompatible. There is a danger of subsuming indigenous identity into a "hybrid" settler identity and masking colonial relations in the present. In Australia for instance, where struggles for Aboriginal land rights continue to take place, there is no clear indication whether colonial relations that frame this interaction have become "postcolonial" (Anderson, 1995) . As the recent history of Aboriginal land rights in Australia indicates, there are significant continuities from "past" colonial relations and practices into present day land rights issues (Bachelard, 1998) . While acknowledging some of the injustices of the past (always "well-intentioned", such as the forcible separation of Aboriginal children from their families), governmental rhetoric resolutely fails to acknowledge the continuity of colonial relations. As Said (1986) points out in his discussion on the postcolonial experience, the notion that power must be shared in the present is still not acknowledged. Rather, there is a constant "drawing of lines and the defending of barriers as in the enormously complex and interesting interchange between former colonial partners" (p.50).
Postcolonial practices in contemporary Australia can only be examined once the genocidal oppression of its indigenous population is recognized, and issues of compensation, legal and political rights are raised and negotiated, something that the current Australian government has consistently refused to do (Muecke, 1992) . We are far away from such a situation. When discussing the case of the Jabiluka uranium mine, it might be more appropriate not to focus on the term postcolonialism as it is generally understood but rather to ask, who is defining postcolonialism and for what purpose and then examine the consequences of such a position. The position I take in this paper in describing relations between indigenous communities with governments and business corporations is located in what Perera and Pugliese describe as "the fraught space riven by an ongoing colonial desire to exploit the land, its resources and peoples, and the anti-colonial opposition to colonizing institutions and practices" (p. 72). Perhaps, "recolonization", a term employed by Aboriginal activist Jacqui Katona, is more appropriate.
Discourses on Aboriginality, as can be expected, unfolded in the western academe very much rooted in the tradition of what Katona (1998) calls the "academic mindset of skull measuring". Muecke (1992) describes three kinds of discourses on Aboriginality by European authors: the anthropological, the romantic and the racist. All three discourses arose from perceptions of difference and relationships of dominance and all three share some similarities. Discursive practices that emerged from the anthropological "discovery" of the native is aptly described by Radhakrishnan (1994) as the "I think, therefore you are" syndrome. Objective knowledge of the Aborigine was produced by the canons of anthropology using a functionalist-empirical approach that excluded any possibility of dialogue (Muecke, 1992) . In fact, as Said (1986) points out the basis of European ethnography depended on the incapacity of the native to negotiate or disrupt scientific discourse about them. Thus, knowledge of the Aborigine was constructed based on descriptions of totemic rites, rituals, kinship patterns and other formulations that are characteristic of the tribe of European anthropologists. Even so-called "critical" approaches to anthropology that attempted to reconstruct European-Aboriginal relationships in Australia, suffered from the same Eurocentric bias that they claimed to disavow. In an attempt to gain insights into "Aboriginal perspectives" on colonial history, Anderson (1983) conducted a case study of Aborigines and tin mining in Northern Queensland. His remarkable conclusion, reached through "extensive fieldwork" was that mining in the Aboriginal community despite its ecological problems and the socio-cultural changes that resulted, was "a course of action wholly in line with (Aboriginal) cultural patterns" and actually "helped ensure their survival" (p.496). It was only when mining was halted, that the problems of the Aboriginal community began: because of the "new social relations and the desire for new goods", the communities were forced to move into urban areas where they lived "on the fringes" and thus the entity that formed "traditional" Aboriginal society "disappeared" forever. Of course, the fact that knowledge of "Aboriginal cultural patterns" was constructed using the same discursive practices of anthropology and the "inevitability" of development as a "natural" outcome of civilization was never in question.
The romantic discourse is characterized by stories of the "Aboriginal tragedy" and mourns the "passing" of a "barbaric and primitive", yet "noble" race. Muecke (1992) discusses one such book, The Passing of the Aborigines by Daisy Bates, a "Victorian adventurer" who spent twenty years "looking after" Aboriginal people, as an example of the romantic discourse. Since "civilization" had arrived in the continent, the "primitive" ways of life would be overcome: the fact that Aborigines would "disappear" was accepted as a logical outcome. Bates' aim in writing her book was "to make their passing easier and to keep the dreaded half-caste menace from our great continent. They should be left as free as possible, to pass from existence as happily as may be" (Bates, 1966 , cited in Muecke, 1992 . These stories did not just play out in the imagination of the colonizers but had real impacts on government policy. The harrowing stories of the "stolen generation", Aboriginal children forcibly removed from their families, are described in a recent report by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission entitled Bringing Them Home (1997) . The logic of this policy was that the children (especially the "half-castes") should not be brought up in the "primitive" way but were to be sent to missions and schools to be "civilized". The "full-blooded" Aborigine would "pass away" in time (in effect, be "bred out") and the only remaining "problem" was to "raise the status" of the "half-castes" so they could be absorbed into the white population (Reynolds, 1989) . The romantic discourse was rich in such racist metaphors. The third discourse constructed and represented Aboriginality in terms of their essential racial difference (Muecke, 1992) . Thus, all Aboriginal practices, including present day social issues such as alcohol and drug abuse, are explained in genetic terms.
Some writers describe another discourse, which they see as being potentially liberating. Aboriginality as political identity, survival, resistance and independence are themes underlying this discourse (Hollinsworth, 1992; Keefe, 1988; Sheridan, 1988) . These writers argue that focusing only on cultural continuities or Aboriginal descent in constructing Aboriginality is "reductionist and essentialist" whereas the Aboriginality-as-resistance model is a more dynamic concept that is "progressive, forward-looking rather than retrospective" (Hollinsworth, p.149) . However, representation of Aboriginality has become a contentious issue in recent years. The fact that constructions of Aboriginality have been shaped by colonial and racist discourses should come as no surprise: what is interesting and problematic is the fact that representations of Aboriginality in "postcolonial" Australia continue to be dominated by non-Aboriginal people.
Several Aboriginal activists and academics have launched blistering attacks on non-Aboriginal representations (constructed mainly by white academics) of Aboriginal identity (Anderson, 1994 (Anderson, , 1995 Dodson, 1994; Watego, 1989) with the quite reasonable argument that it is none of their business to define who or what Aborigines are. As Anderson (1994) argues, the creation of a particular form of knowledge about Aboriginality is linked with the power of organizing and regulating Aboriginal life and even the rhetoric of "self-determination" is often informed by colonial practices. If the aim of colonialism was to control the people's wealth and resources in terms of what was produced and how it was produced (Ngugi, 1986) , colonization of Aboriginal Australia was about controlling land -the real wealth (possibly the only one that matters) of indigenous peoples all over the world. Indigenous identity and culture cannot be separated from the land -the nature-culture dichotomy, so prevalent in Western thought is an alien epistemology for indigenous peoples (Dodson, 1998; Ridgeway, 1998) . Dispossession of the land was in Ngugi's (1986) terms, "to control in other words the entire realm of the language of real life" (p. 16), it was the control of Aboriginal culture which in turn, impacted how self-definitions of Aboriginality were constructed, definitions that are based on their relationship with the colonizers. This control was achieved either through attempts to eradicate their culture, or the control of its production and distribution, as is evidenced by the increasing world-wide demand for indigenous art, a market which is tightly controlled by non-indigenous dealers and institutions. The dominance of language (and here I mean not just speech or writing, but also the language of theory and the language of thought) was also crucial to the domination of the processes of identity construction.
This pattern can be seen in the more recent academic notions of Aboriginality which, despite its liberatory intent and its contempt for "essentialist" notions of Aboriginality are also problematic in the sense that the sophisticated theorizations themselves are responsible for "subjecting of Aboriginal identity to the moral demands of a certain theorized politics" (Lattas, 1993, p. 245) . The liberal (and predominantly white) approach to Aboriginality advocates adopting a survival and resistance model while rejecting the notions of constructing Aboriginal identity through reflections of inheritance or a cultural past. The latter approach is seen as being too "essentialist" and much theorizing is done on how past racist assumptions of Aboriginality were based on these fallacious "essences".
Two problems arise in this interpretation: first, there is the patronizing, almost insulting directive (from middle class white academics) that tells Aboriginal people how to construct their own identity in order to avoid theoretical pitfalls of Western modernistic research ideology. Second, the much belabored strawperson of modernity, the concept of essentialism, is flogged once again. As Radhakrishnan ((1994) points out, accusations of essentialism seem to be regularly foisted on non-western sites which "(are) made to take on the dark and mysterious burden of essentialism, whereas the West is busy producing its own powerful history" (p. 317). What Lattas (1993) calls the "tyranny of theory" is at work again with accusations of essentialism directed at Aboriginal identity politics. There is a double-edged irony to this theoretical sophistry: the Western pre-deconstruction modes of thought that set up binary oppositions before they were deconstructed and exposed as being essentialist are now being used to evaluate indigenous modes of knowing and being that never accepted binarity in the first place (Radhakrishnan, 1994) . Rejecting attempts to incorporate past cultural images into present Aboriginal identity because they are essentialist is wrong: resistance movements often strategically deploy essentialist themes culturally and politically and strategic essentialism can play an empowering role in identity politics and articulating forms of resistance (Lattas, 1993; Spivak, 1988a) . There is no reason why recreating a historicized connection with a past and maintaining a sense of tradition should be problematic because of its "essentialist" overtones: as Anderson (1997) points out, even the most radical and critical postmodernist arguments favoring notions of hybridity, fluidity and change over essentialism only succeed in "essentializing non-essentialism" (p. 12). This unbridled antiessentialism only serves to deny Aboriginal people their memories, justifiable protests and demands for compensation.
For example, in a recent land claim made by the Yorta Yorta people, the Federal Court of Australia ruled in December 1998 that "the tide of history had swept away any claims of the Yorta Yorta people to their traditional land" (Rintoul, 1998) . In his statement of dismissal, Justice Howard Olney ruled that the claimants "had ceased to occupy their traditional land in accordance with their traditional laws and customs" and that "native title rights and interests once lost are not capable of revival" (Rintoul, 1998, p. 11) . The judgement highlights modes of institutional forgetting in the representation of Aboriginal rights: the reason that the Yorta Yorta people "had ceased to occupy their traditional land" was because they were removed from their land by white settlers and placed in missions and the fact that their "traditions" (in this case, mainly language) were not passed on was because in the missions, speaking "native" languages was a punishable offence.
The violence of this judgement is best summed up in the words of Des Morgan, one of Yorta Yorta's principal claimants: "Do you have to be naked and dancing for them to recognize you as Aboriginal? My ancestors' spirits still walk that land, the same as my spirit will walk the land when I die and my children's spirit will follow me. How can they deny our existence? I don't need a white judge to tell me who I am. I am Yorta Yorta" (Rintoul, 1998, p. 11) . The authority of institutional memory (in this case, of the legal system and the media) in presenting the "real" present as a representation of past realities arises from a narrative of power that is embedded in the discourse of the production of history (Banerjee and Osuri, 2000) . The use of Aboriginal memory by Aboriginal peoples to produce some expression of collective identity in the present is crucial to their politics of identity: rejecting this process as being "theoretically limited" because memory contains fictitious essences, precludes transforming modes of domination into distinctively Aboriginal forms of resistance. As Lattas (1993) points out, arguments by white theorists to relinquish using "essential" forms of Aboriginality to articulate Aboriginal identity simply serves to police images of Aboriginal authenticity and is another form of cultural hegemony rather than the cultural pluralism that is so celebrated by much of contemporary social theory.
So far I have discussed some of the limitations of employing a postcolonial framework to examine Aboriginal relations with modern institutions in the present and how discourses of Aboriginality continue to be situated in dominant Western epistemological frameworks. In the next section I discuss the history of relationships between Aboriginal communities and the mining industry which will provide the background for an examination of the Jabiluka case.
Wealth Under Land in Land Down Under: Mining and Development in Australia
Since the earliest times of European invasion, the two industries that led to the greatest dispossession of Aboriginal peoples from their land were the pastoral and mining industries. As mining became an important part of the Australian economy, private and public interests heightened accordingly. "Development" became the buzzword of the post World War II era and resource extraction was the engine that drove development in Australia. The discourse of development, from the focus on the economic in the 1950's to a more "social and human needs" approach in the 1970's dictated how the world should achieve economic progress. As several scholars have pointed out (Escobar, 1995; Esteva, 1987; Mies and Shiva, 1993; Shiva, 1989) , the strategy of development in the Third World produced the opposite effect: underdevelopment, debt crises, and exploitation. Indigenous peoples throughout the world suffered the brunt of development. They were classified as living in a "subsistence" economy and needed to "develop" in order to reach "acceptable" standards of living. This had enormous economic and sociocultural influences on indigenous peoples and farmers throughout the world: for instance, all resources were directed at producing cash crops rather than the traditional crops people used to grow. The detrimental effects of this form of development undermined subsistence and as several scholars argue, actually led to underdevelopment (Shiva, 1989; Hyndman, 1987; Mies and Shiva, 1993) .
Large-scale mining in Africa, the Asia-Pacific, North and South America also devastated many indigenous communities, several of whom are engaged in struggles with governments and business corporations to this day. The global mining industry is (and has been so for more than fifty years) controlled by a handful of transnational corporations with the inevitable mergers and acquisitions that characterize global corporate hegemony. The initial postcolonial scenario has changed: whereas the large mining corporations of the 1950's and 1960's were forced to cede controlling interests to the governments of newly independent countries, more recent trends of deregulation, privatization, and relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions have led to a global restructuring of the mining industry, an industry that is increasingly resembling what it looked like during colonial times (Moody, 1996) .
In an insightful analysis of the development discourse, Escobar (1995) has demonstrated how development first created the notion of poverty (based on modern, capitalist indicators such as dollar income per capita, material possession, resource extraction, science and technology, market economies) then "modernized" the poor, transforming them into the "assisted" thus setting in place new modes of relations and mechanisms of control under the clarion call of "development". Contemporary discourses of aid and development agencies are related to notions of progress and civilization that inform colonial anthropology and continue to permeate society through neo-colonial modes of political authority (Bhabha, 1994) . International aid agencies operate on the assumption that economic progress ultimately leads to social progress, and that development can solve poverty and social problems on a global scale. Problems were constructed, solutions applied and development proceeded by creating "abnormalities" such as the "illiterate", the "underdeveloped", the "landless peasants" who would later be treated and reformed (Escobar, 1995, p. 56) . This was a scientific and technological process that subsumed differences in culture, transforming people into variables in the grand equation of "progress" and validating the assimilative imperatives of development in the name of national interest.
This regime of development depended solely on the modern Western knowledge system, and rejected and marginalized non-Western forms of knowledge. Development became "a metaphor (that gave) global hegemony to a purely Western genealogy of history, robbing people of different cultures of the opportunity to define forms of their social life" (Esteva, 1992, p. 9) . In Foucauldian terms, development derived its power from "subjugated knowledge… a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated; naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity" (Foucault, 1978, p. 82) . If the history of development is to be seen as a history of imperialism and colonialism, it is the power-knowledge nexus that can illustrate how development came to be seen as a version of reality and entrenched as the only normative reality (Spivak, 1988b) . The real success of development, as Escobar (1995) points out, was to synthesize, arrange, manage and direct entire populations and countries based on a unitary system resulting in the "colonization and domination of natural and human ecologies" (p. 71). In the postcolonial era, these mechanisms of control are still very much in place whether through international institutions like the World Bank or government policies of industrialization and modernization.
Governments, at first British, then Australian federal, state and territory governments have always had a significant impact on Aboriginal life. I use the term "government" here in the Foucauldian sense of the term, as an element of corporate government rationality. The notion of "governmentality" (Foucault, 1979 ; see also Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991) refers to an understanding of settler-indigenous relationships through an institutional-political framework (Washington, 1995) and which has "as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism apparatuses of security" (Foucault, 1979, p. 19) . Control was achieved through public policy: at first by a policy of segregation (the infamous "Aboriginal Protection Policy"), followed by a policy of assimilation and now a policy of so-called reconciliation (which the current federal government says it is committed to achieving, but in a perverse paradoxical twist resolutely refuses to apologize for past injustices, despite formal apologies being issued by state and local governments, the church and even a few mining companies).
The issue of Aboriginal land rights was also framed through juridico-legal processes along with economic milieus that managed Aboriginal access to their land. Before Australia became a federation in 1901, the different state governments, who received their authority from the king or queen of England, developed laws relating to land use. Based on British common law, Australia became a colony of England because it was settled as terra nullius or land belonging to no one. This absurd notion that Australian history and geography began when England acquired "sovereignty" (by simply "occupying" the land) was overturned only in 1992 in a landmark legal case that resulted in the enactment of the Native Title Act in 1993. Unlike their counterparts in New Zealand, Canada and the United States, Aborigines do not have any constitutional recognition in Australia and the Native Title Act was therefore seen as a major step forward. However, these gains were shortlived: a bitter fight that pitted the Aboriginal community against federal and state governments, the mining lobby, the agricultural and industrial lobby, resulted in significant amendments to the Act in 1998, amendments that severely eroded the gains made by Native Title Act (Bachelard, 1998) . The aim of these amendments, according to the government, was to achieve "workability" of the Native Title Act. There is little doubt that the amendments demonstrated who the Act was really supposed to "work" for: the mining and pastoral industries (Bachelard, 1998; Howitt, 1998; Kauffman, 1998 ).
An important outcome of this Act was the establishment of Aboriginal land councils who were responsible for representing the interests of Aboriginal communities specifically impacted by mining and resource exploration. The land council members were Aboriginal representatives elected by the local Aboriginal communities. The land council is authorized to negotiate mining leases with the government or the mining company including aspects such as royalty payments, environmental impact assessment, protection of sacred sites, education, training and employment for local communities directly impacted by mining. The extent to which the land councils are actually representative of the needs and aspirations of Aboriginal communities impacted by mining is in some doubt: several Aboriginal leaders claim that the land councils are an extension of the Commonwealth Government and are accountable to them rather than the communities they are supposed to represent (Anderson, 1995; Katona, 1998) . The councils are run like any typical government agency with the same bureaucratic modes of control; in fact it is precisely the neocolonial mechanisms of control that raises questions about whose needs the land councils really represent.
Prior to the Native Title Act of 1993, state governments and territories had developed their own land laws (see Kauffman, 1998 for a description of the legislation). Australia's first Royal Commission into Aboriginal land rights was appointed after decades of political action by many Aboriginal groups protesting the mining of Aboriginal land without permission from the Aboriginal communities who lived on that land. The first regional land rights legislation was the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act of 1976, under which former Aboriginal reserves were transferred to Aboriginal "ownership". However, this did not mean Aboriginal people had any "right of veto" over mining in their lands: the government could legally authorize mining irrespective of the traditional owners' wishes if mining was though to be in the "national interest". Along with legal title came mining and tourism interests, both profitable and highimpact industries, both controlled by governments and corporations with virtually no Aboriginal say in the matter.
Mining is a key industry in Australia and mining operations have been taking place for nearly 150 years. Over 60% of Australia's commodity exports come from mining, accounting for over $36 billion of Australia's export earnings (Kauffman, 1998) . The industry has a deplorable record in dealing with Aboriginal communities: from physical coercion and killings in early colonial days to institutional and economic coercion in more recent times (Roberts, 1985) . Legal requirements and increased Aboriginal political activism have compelled most of the leading mining companies to rethink their strategy of dealing with Aboriginal communities. As we shall see later, this so-called "stakeholder approach" where mining companies position Aboriginal communities as their "preferred development partner" (Howitt, 1998) is also quite problematic in that it sets up neocolonial relations that manage and control Aboriginal life.
Defence of mining activities whether by governments or corporations followed a predictable pattern: the focus was on economic benefits, national development and national security and any adverse consequences such as environmental damage or socio-cultural impacts on Aboriginal communities were justified because of the "overall" economic benefit (McEachern, 1995) . Numbers are used to quantify these benefits: so many new jobs, so many dollars of export income, percentage of royalty payments and taxation, dollar value of investment, etc. Quantification was always an important part of the bureaucracy in colonial times and served to create an understanding of a controllable indigenous reality (Appadurai, 1996) . Socio-cultural impacts such as the breakdown of traditional relations, the destruction of sacred sites, displacement and disruptions in patterns of indigenous life could not be quantified and either did not enter the equation at all or were framed as "costs" that could be addressed through royalty payments to the affected communities. The devastation that mining has wrought on indigenous communities throughout the world cannot be measured, in economic terms or otherwise. Apart from the damaging socio-cultural consequences caused by mining, traditional means of sustenance and support were irretrievably affected: destruction of hunting land, depletion and contamination of freshwater resources, siltation and pollution of rivers, lakes and oceans, and widespread deforestation were are only some of the damages caused by mining. The Rio summit of 1992 attempted to address indigenous concerns through its agenda of sustainable development (another postcolonial sleight-of-hand designed to save the world from ecological destruction, see Visvanathan (1991) and Banerjee (1999) for a critique of sustainable development) and highlighted the role of indigenous communities in achieving sustainable development. The role of the mining industry did not even register a mention in the entire document.
The benefits reflected by the number of jobs and dollars in royalty payments that result from mining are of little use to Aboriginal communities in Australia who are impacted by mining (Katona, 1998) . Health, education, life expectancy, essential services and housing for Aboriginal people continue to be the worst in the country, well below national averages. Mineral wealth extracted from Aboriginal lands in the Northern Territory provided more than $10 billion in gross revenue since 1978: however most Aboriginal communities in the area live in dire poverty with little scope to access resources for education and training or gain political power (Kauffman, 1998) . Even assuming that employment in the mining companies is necessarily a good thing (I for one, do not make that assumption), Aboriginal employment in the companies that mine their land is minimal and is restricted to casual, unskilled, minimum-wage jobs (Roberts, 1981) . The subsidies given to the Northern Territory government by the Commonwealth largely supports government services and infrastructure and Aboriginal and all available evidence indicates that Aboriginal people do not receive a fair share of these benefits (Kauffman, 1998) . In fact, a significant component of the Northern Territory government's budget is directed toward opposing land claims made by Aboriginal communities and contesting these claims in court! A closer look at the alleged economic benefits of mining for Aboriginal communities reveals a somewhat less rosy picture of reality. Royalty payments are not the solution: several studies, by government and non-government agencies have shown that royalty payments do not provide the benefits they were designed to and the socio-economic condition of Aboriginal communities continues to stagnate (Kauffman, 1998) . Very little of the millions of dollars in royalty payments over the years is seen by traditional owners impacted by mining: most of the money goes to maintain government infrastructure and pay for land council expenses. A portion of the money is also used to provide basic services other citizens expect the government to provide. The per capita amount of money received from royalty payments is very modest, ranging from $450 to $700 per person per year. These payments do nothing to address the fundamental problems of poor health, lack of local infrastructure, absence of tertiary education and chronic unemployment. The rural indigenous median family income is $5256 which is 61% of the non-indigenous rural family median income after accounting for differences in family size. Unemployment among indigenous people is about 40% compared to Australia's total unemployment rate of 8%. Although Aboriginal people comprise 25% of the population in the Northern Territory (a region where more than half of all mining in Australia is carried out), they comprise only 7% of the workforce, mainly in minimum-wage casual jobs (Kauffman, 1998) . The evidence of the impact of mining in Australia is quit clear: whatever benefits that arise are appropriated by corporations, state and federal governments while Aboriginal communities who face the greatest economic, social, and cultural burdens do not share in any of the rewards. Having provided a setting for the relations between mining interests and Aboriginal communities, I now turn to the case of the Jabiluka uranium mine and examine how discourses of development and colonial relations continue to inform mining projects in Australia.
The Case of the Environmentally-friendly and Culturally-sensitive Uranium Mine 2 The Jabiluka uranium mine is probably one of the most controversial issues of the decade in Australia. It is a complex issue involving traditional Aboriginal owners, environmental groups and other NGO's, federal and territory governments, the mining company, and the powerful mining and minerals lobby. Environmental concerns and the violation of Aboriginal land rights are the central objections of groups that oppose the mine. Recent opinion polls indicate that two thirds of Australians are opposed to the mine (Miller, 1999) . Apart from the dangerous nature of uranium itself, a major environmental concern is potential contamination caused by "tailings" (fine particles left at the end of any mining process). For each ton of uranium oxide extracted, about 40,000 tons of tailings reman behind as low level radioactive waste. These tailings have up to 85% of the ore's original radioactivity and can remain radioactive for 300,000 to 700,000 years (Verjauw, 1997) . The proposed mine at Jabiluka is an underground mine, to be built below the flood plains in an area infamous for its long and very wet season. There are concerns about the long term safety of the dam that will enclose the tailings and the absence of a coherent waste water management policy (Christophersen and Langton, 1995) . Environmentalists cite two cases in the Philippines where similar tailings dams constructed in a similar climactic region collapsed during the wet season, contaminating lakes and streams in the region and rendering large tracts of land uninhabitable.
To make matters worse, the world-famous Kakadu wetlands, a World Heritage site is also located near the Jabiluka mine. Contamination could also endanger Aboriginal sacred sites of significance throughout the valley. The government and the mining company insist that all safeguards have been met and the uranium mine is "environmentally friendly". The debate on Jabiluka is also part of a larger issue: Jabiluka in the first of 26 possible uranium mines within Australia which the Howard government will be asked to approve, hence this case is being closely watched by environmentalists, the mining industry, human rights groups and political analysts.
The government and the mining company have stood firm, insisting that the mine would go ahead, stating that all environmental safeguards have been met and Aboriginal interests have been accommodated, a position that is being challenged in courts and in the public sphere by environmental activists, Aboriginal activists, scientists, academics, political leaders, students and many other sections of the Australian public. The protests were at a national and local level: at one stage the Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation representing the traditional owners, along with the main organization coordinating the nation-wide protest, the Jabiluka Action Group, organized a six-month long blockade of the mine site, bussing protestors from different parts of the country to stop construction of the mine. Hundreds of protestors were arrested and jailed including Yvonne Margarula, the senior traditional owner who, ironically, was charged for trespassing in her own land. The protests did succeed in delaying the project considerably. The protests also received international attention culminating in a UNESCO investigation of the project in 1998 which recommended that another environmental and social impact assessment be carried out before mining began, otherwise the area could be placed on the endangered heritage list. This recommendation is being vigorously challenged by the Howard government.
Jabiluka has one of the largest deposits of uranium in Australia, most of which is located on Aboriginal land. Uranium was first discovered in the region in the early 1970's and was accompanied by the inevitable rush of mining companies lobbying Federal and State governments for mining leases. Three sites were proposed in the region at Ranger, Nabarlek and Jabiluka. Mining did not proceed immediately as the Labor government of 1972 placed a moratorium on new uranium mines in the wake of a national debate on the benefits of uranium mining. It was felt that an official inquiry was required and the Fox Commission was appointed by the Federal government to evaluate the impact of mining in the region. This is how the 1977 report of the Fox Commission described Aboriginal reaction to mining: "It was established to the satisfaction of the Commission that the Aboriginal people concerned were opposed to mining on their land…..while royalties and other payments… are not unimportant to the Aboriginal people…our impression is that they would happily forego the lot in exchange for an assurance that mining would not proceed….It is not likely that the mining venture will add appreciably to the number of Aborigines employed" (Roberts, 1981, p. 128 ).
In its conclusion, however, the Fox Commission delivered a pro-mining judgement: "In the end, we formed the conclusion that their opposition should not be allowed to prevail". The reasons given were the "overall benefits" mining would deliver to the Australian economy. This report cleared the way for uranium mining in the region and the new Liberal government, which had a more pro-uranium-mining policy than the Labor government, supervised the final negotiations over the Ranger mine which began production in 1981. The fact that the mines are located in the Kakadu region of the Northern Territory, a region that was declared a National Park in 1979 and is listed as a World Heritage site, adds a bizarre twist of irony in the debate over uranium mining. Kakadu National Park is an enormously popular tourist destination receiving over 300,000 tourists a year. Negotiations on a second mine at Jabiluka started soon after the Ranger deal and the government and the mining company claimed that official "consent" was obtained from the then senior traditional owner, Toby Gangale in 1982. The current traditional owner is his eldest daughter, Yvonne Margarula.
The company involved in negotiations at the time was the Ranger Uranium Mining Company, now owned and operated by Energy Resources of Australia (ERA) whose parent company is North Ltd which has a 65% holding in ERA. ERA supplies 8% of the western world's uranium and the Ranger mine is expected to keep producing until 2009. In 1998, ERA's total workforce at Ranger was 233 with "minimal" Aboriginal employment (Kauffman, 1998) . ERA purchased the Jabiluka mineral lease in 1991, an area located 14 miles north of Ranger, for $125 million where the new mine is being built and which is at the center of the current dispute. Formal negotiations about the Jabiluka mine had begun in 1981 with Pancontinental Ltd, whose parent company is also North Ltd. Thus, the key stakeholders involved in negotiating mining agreements were the traditional owners, the Northern Territory land council, federal and state government officials and the mining company. I will examine some key stakeholder interactions within the theoretical framework of stakeholder theory and highlight the colonial and neocolonial relations of power underlying these relations.
The land rights legislation in the Northern Territories specified that consent had to be obtained from Aboriginal communities before any mining agreements were signed. The Northern Land Council was authorized to negotiate on behalf of the local Aboriginal communities who would be impacted by mining. "Consent" was the key issue: the current dispute over mining in Jabiluka also focuses on consent, which the traditional owners claim was obtained fraudulently. After the Fox Commission gave their approval on uranium mining in Ranger in 1979 (overriding the wishes of local Aboriginal communities), the traditional owners decided not to consent to mining. This meant the traditional owners were opposing not only the federal and territory governments and the mining company but also the organization created by government to represent Aboriginal interests -the Northern Land Council. The traditional owners, the Mirrar people expected that the land council would support their opposition to mining by helping them get their land back.
They were in for a rude shock. In a meeting with the traditional owners in 1978 during negotiations for the Ranger mine, the Chairperson of the Northern Land Council said:
"The Northern Land Council also has to know that the community which will be affected by the mining at Ranger have had a fair chance to say what they want to say to the Northern Land Council. This does not mean that the members of the Northern Land Council do what the community says. When you make the decision have in mind that we are entitled to be pushed around by any government in power. We are being pushed around today and we will be pushed around tomorrow, and we will be pushed around forever. That is a fact of life"
After the Fox Commission made its recommendation to proceed with mining, the Land Council's approach was to make the best of a bad deal: get legal land title and negotiate decent royalty payments. This was seen as a pragmatic approach with the quite reasonable assumption that if they were not part of the negotiations, the process would go on without them (a letter to that effect was written by the mining company to the Council), which would be even more harmful. The economic view prevailed because the alternative view, an Aboriginal view of land, could not be effectively articulated within the economic rationalist and corporate government rationalist structures in which the negotiations were conducted. The Land Council, supposedly representative of Aboriginal views and aspirations has to operate and implement policies in a legislative framework that is designed to serve non-Aboriginal interests. As Katona (1998) points out, the Land Council is an extension of the Federal Government and has no actual decisionmaking authority, its responsibility is largely consultative.
The Land Councils are beneficiaries of all agreements reached on Aboriginal lands and receive a significant percentage of the royalty payments. The Northern Land Council's infrastructure, staffing and other costs are met through royalty payments. The future of the organization depends on these payments and there could be a potential conflict of interest between representing traditional owners' needs and the Land Council's need for financial resources to ensure its survival. This is the current problem: traditional owners require a system in which they can negotiate their future and the Land Council is culturally closer to Aboriginal communities than governments and mining companies. However, the neocolonial structures of bureaucratic organizations direct the ways Land Councils can be governed and accountability is established through capitalist and neocolonial frameworks. The "postcolonial" government's policy of dealing with Aboriginal people is in effect, the same as the colonial policy but employs more sophisticated means of control. The impact on traditional owners is thus doubly traumatic as Katona points out:
"because (the Land Council) is a beneficiary in the event of a mine going ahead, people could say that that Northern Land Council isn't interested in fulfilling traditional owners' instructions because they would then sacrifice a monetary benefit which would keep the organization going. So people came to the conclusion that the Northern Land Council couldn't represent their interests, people formed the conclusion that the Land Council really belonged to the government and didn't belong to Aboriginal people out here. That's significant in itself also. Not only to have your decision overridden, to be violated in that way, but continuing steps of oppression to be taken by organizations which you were told are going to represent your interests. And that's been a critical social impact out here. And people have no infrastructure in which to articulate their view, in which to develop an informed view. So the sense of powerlessness became entrenched, the sense of powerlessness pervaded all parts of everybody's life".
The view of the traditional owners was very clear: any development proposals on their land, whether it was uranium mining (to which they were firmly opposed) or tourism would be discussed after the land claim was successful under the assumption that once they got their land back legally, they could enforce such a ban. The organization that would help them negotiate the maze of legalities in obtaining legal title over their land was the Northern Land Council. Unfortunately, the traditional owners desire to control development in their land, an integral part of what the Land Rights Act stood for, was negated either through political negotiation or through legislative amendments. At the Ranger negotiations, Ian Viner, the then Minister for Aboriginal Affairs said: "This has being going on for a long time. Six years its been going on. So the question now is not whether or not there is going to be mining, but how is it going to be carried out. We think it is a fair agreement and we think it's a proper agreement for the Aboriginal people and for the whole of Australia. And we have now reached the time when we need to make a decision. In your hearts you would prefer that mining didn't come. We know that. The government had to listen not only the voice of the Aboriginal people but to the voice of all Australia. We can make that decision today. We can take the heartache away from it. We can use the uranium agreement as a foundation for your people, to look to the future, for yourself and your children and to work to the future for yourself and your children." Toby Gangale interrupted the Minister to say, "I'm Toby Gangale. That's my country up there. Give us time to organize. We don't have to sign agreement now. We don't have to go to mining now." But, as usual, the voice of "all Australia" had spoken without listening to the voice of Aboriginal Australia. And as for "looking to the future"? For the next six years Toby Gangale and the Mirrar people watched as bulldozers carved up their land as the Ranger mine was built and waited for the benefits that never came. Katona uses the term "ecocide" to describe the effects of mining:
"Having uranium mining in the Mirrar's backyard hasn't led to any great benefits. It brought along social changes which made them more depressed, which dispossessed them even more from their own land. And it's left them with a legacy of bad health, no houses, no infrastructure, no employment. It has brought them not economic independence, but ecocide….a sense of powerlessness. Alcohol consumption in this area is a symptom of powerlessness. Alcohol has become an anaesthetic in some sense in this community. People anaesthetize themselves to what they see around them to their inability to be able to control their lives. That's led to other poor health outcomes, poor educational outcomes, poor employment outcomes. There's no opportunity to change their lifestyles, the lifestyle which has come about as a direct result of the history in this area. We can't expect individuals to be able to overcome those barriers. There has to be resources provided. There has to be infrastructure which reflects indigenous values and beliefs, which is able to advocate on their behalf to be able to turn this around" And, as for monetary benefits, Yvonne Margarula, the current senior traditional owner had this to say:
"But we know we own the country, we know, we born the country. We live the country. This our country, it is country, black country, not white country. This not white people's land, this not Balanda (white, European) land this is Bining land, black fella land, this Aboriginal land. That (the Ranger uranium mine) already ruined all our culture, everything…. the Ranger mine. And now he's going ahead at Jabiluka? More problems coming up. Money not gonna fixing anything. It kill us. When we see that money, ohh, people happy to see that money. But not me. They can take it back -it white fella money, not black fella money."
In a historic gesture, the traditional owners even tried returning the money they had received from the Jabiluka lease hoping that this would stop the mine. But the Land Council said they had to honor the earlier "agreement", the company's position was the same, they had their "agreement".
The government was satisfied that legal requirements were met under the Native Title Act, they had their "consent".
The ink was barely dry on the Ranger agreement when another company, Pancontinental started negotiations for a second mine at Jabiluka. And so began another exhausting round of meetings with the traditional owners who were still unsure what "title" to their land meant. It was becoming clear to them that they couldn't get title if they did not consent to mining. The only reason they participated in the negotiation process and expected the Land Council to represent them was to get the land title so they could stop mining in the first place. And the pressure to "consent" came from all sides. Essentially, "consent" was obtained under duress, through false promises and thinly veiled threats (of losing land) and creating confusion as to what the agreement actually meant.
Pressure on the Land Council to strike a deal was mounting, especially after it was revealed that the mining company, Pancontinental, had lodged an opposing detriment claim on the same land. At the negotiation meetings, the Land Council and the traditional owners had very different understandings on what the meetings were all about: the traditional owners thought (or were told) the meetings were about the land claim, not mining agreements whereas the Land Council was looking for a trade-off between mining agreements and land claims. According to Jacob Nayunggul, who served as the translator for the Northern Land Council in their negotiations with traditional owners of Jabiluka in 1981: "no one understood…even I tried to interpret what Land Council lawyer told me. I think it didn't come out straight to main traditional owner. Far as I know, he kept on saying no. They not agree to mining. No"
The Land Rights Act called for widespread "consultations" with Aboriginal communities and this process of meetings continued for almost two years with limited participation by the traditional owners. The Land Council was following procedures laid down in the Act but the content of the consultations focused on employment, education, health care and housing -the good things the mine would bring them and not on the rights of traditional owners to the title of the land. The final meeting, which dealt with the actual issue of "consent" lasted more than 4 days. Katona describes this last meeting: "The last meeting and the consultations and negotiations that took place over 18 months, was a meeting about consent. The agreement had been negotiated, all points had been agreed upon by the Northern Land Council and Pancontinental. And saved until the last meeting, was the issue of consent. Yvonne's father (Toby Gangale, the senior owner) was very sick at that meeting. He was run down by the process. He was so worn down that he couldn't sit at that meeting -he spent most of that meeting lying down. And finally at the end of that meeting when the question of consent was put, he got up and addressed the legal advisers and the people attending that meeting. And he said 'I'm tired now, I can't fight anymore'. That was consent. That was officially and legally all that was required to embody legal consent for a project to go ahead".
The mining company's position was predictable and mirrored the government's position: all environmental safeguards had been met, the agreement had to be honored and any adverse social and cultural impact of the mine would be "constructively addressed" by the Federal and Territory governments as well as the mining company. Let us now examine the framework that these agencies use in addressing Aboriginal issues, a framework that allows particular types of questions to be posed and particular types of answers to emerge.
The Complicities of Stakeholder Theory
A popular framework touted by many management scholars for addressing organizationenvironment interactions is stakeholder theory. This approach continues to receive a great deal of attention in recent times as is evidenced by the publication of dozens of books and more than 100 articles in journals (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) . While conventional theories of the firm focus on its responsibilities toward its shareholders, a stakeholder perspective takes a broader view and implies that a company should consider the needs of all its stakeholders. Stakeholders are defined as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the organization's objectives" (Freeman and Reed, 1983, p. 91) . This broad view is not without its problems: different stakeholders have differing stakes and balancing the needs of competing stakeholders is not an easy task. Moreover, stakeholder theory is derived from Western notions of (economic) rationality and as we shall see, fails to address needs of groups like indigenous stakeholders.
A stakeholder perspective is also supposed to be helpful in analyzing and evaluating an organization's "social performance" in terms of how it manages its relationship with society (Clarkson, 1995) . Stakeholder theory is normative with moral overtones, it focuses on what a company "should" do in order to fulfil it's societal responsibilities; it is also instrumental in that it is expected to lead to better organizational performance (a hypothesis that is yet to be tested); and it is descriptive in that it posits a model of the corporation as a "constellation of cooperative and competitive interests possessing intrinsic value" (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p.66) .
The normative core of stakeholder theory is said to be a driver of corporate social performance and once managers accept their obligations to stakeholders and recognize their legitimacy, the corporation is well on its way to achieving its moral principles (Clarkson, 1995) . This is a simplistic argument that fails to recognize the inability of a framework to represent different realities and the effects of using a single lens to view issues such as legitimacy and responsibility. Proponents of stakeholder theory claim that corporate social performance can be evaluated based on the management of a corporation's relationships with its stakeholders. The fact that social performance needs to be "managed", implies that, as is done with business ethics, it is deployed as a strategy designed to benefit the corporation. Who decided what is socially appropriate? Who assesses it? As we have seen, social appropriateness is often subsumed under notions of "progress" and "development" and obscures the fact that somebody is defining appropriateness and somebody else is being appropriated.
The literature on stakeholder theory also distinguishes between a "social" issue and a "stakeholder" issue. According to Clarkson (1995) , a particular society determines what is a social issue and the representative government enacts appropriate legislation to protect social interests. Hence, a test whether an issue is social or not is the presence or absence of legislation. Thus, health and safety, equal opportunity, and environmental issues are social issues because legislation exists. This is an unsatisfactory argument that fails to address the fact that segments of society are legislated against and that for indigenous communities throughout the world, legislation designed to protect their rights is often a legacy of colonialism, regulated by neocolonial modes of control through neocolonial institutions. If there is no legislation, the issue becomes a "stakeholder issue" which needs to be addressed at the corporate level (Clarkson, 1995) .
The argument that business "should" be socially responsible stems from the notion that "society grants legitimacy and power to business and in the long run, those who do not use power in a manner which society considers responsible will tend lose it" (Davis 1973, p.314) . Economic systems, governments and institutions often determine what is "legitimate" and this power to determine legitimacy cannot be easily lost. While customers, employees, shareholders and governments may be able to "withdraw legitimacy", forcing a corporation to either change its approach or perish, the power of Aboriginal communities to do so is constrained by the self-same notion of legitimacy: society, governments and corporations do not doubt that Aborigines are legitimate stakeholders, however, Aboriginal notions of development and land use are not really legitimate alternatives to Western notions of progress and development. Thus while Aboriginal stakeholders are positioned as legitimate whose needs will be "constructively addressed", the stakes that are involved for Aboriginal communities affected by mining are somehow positioned as "illegitimate" or against "national interest". These stakes transcend Western rational categories of "economic", "social" or "cultural" interests. The construction of these categories implies that they are somehow separate, a notion that is incommensurable with Aboriginal notions of culture: what is at stake for Aboriginal communities is their identity, their way of life, the Bining way, an identity and culture that is derived from land itself.
Because the scope and level of application for determining boundaries of legitimacy is institutional and societal, stakeholder theory urges organizations to be "publicly responsible, for outcomes related to their primary and secondary areas of involvement with society" (Preston & Post 1975; Wood, 1991) . This principle of public responsibility is designed to make larger societal concerns more relevant by providing behavioral parameters for organizations. The public debate in the Jabiluka case has focused on the corporation's environmental responsibility as well as its responsibility to Aboriginal stakeholders. However, social responsibilities should be relevant to the "organization's interests" (Wood 1991 ) and therein lies the problem: these "public" responsibilities are defined and framed by larger principles of legitimacy, principles that are inimical to Aboriginal stakeholders in the first place. Thus, the parameters that define a "social outcome" are determined by a system of rules and exclusions that do not address Aboriginal concerns. The public-private dichotomy of stakeholder representation does not legitimize Aboriginal interests, instead it serves to regulate indigenous ways of living. Who is seeking stakeholder input? For what purpose? Public interests are represented by government agencies that seek stakeholder input to obtain information designed to legitimize support for their decisions. The input from Aboriginal communities regarding mining on their land at Jabiluka was unequivocal: they did not want it. The agencies that sought this input admitted the adverse consequences that mining had on Aboriginal society. The decision to mine was motivated by the economic gains to "the nation" (at the cost of irreversible loss to Aboriginal nations) and legitimized by promoting Aboriginal participation in "development". If the domain of public responsibility was designed to serve Aboriginal interests, it has failed them miserably, and the process of stakeholder management, far from being beneficial to Aboriginal stakeholders has further marginalized them. Institutions and agencies that were developed to assess stakeholder needs are grounded in colonial practices and serve to continue the process of internal colonialism in Australia.
If the institutional and organizational levels of corporate social responsibility are inimical to Aboriginal interests, then the principle of "managerial discretion" (Carroll, 1979 ) is even more constrained. According to Wood (1991) , "managers are moral actors. Within every domain of corporate social responsibility, they are obliged to exercise such discretion as is available to them, toward socially responsible outcomes" (p.698). The fallacy of managers as "moral actors" is easily revealed by the Foucauldian notion of subjectification, a mode that reveals how managers become constituted as subjects who secure their meaning and reality through identifying with a particular sense of their relationship with the firm (Knights, 1992) . Individual managers' role in accommodating stakeholder interests is predefined at higher levels and practices at this level are governed and organized by organizational and institutional discourses.
The search for a legitimate, normative core for stakeholder theory must therefore be treated with caution with the understanding that this search, like any search, is predicated on institutional interests. In an attempt to identify which stakeholders really count, Mitchell et al. (1997) classified stakeholders based on their possession of three attributes: power (the stakeholder's power to influence the company), legitimacy (of the stakeholder's relationship with the company) and urgency (the extent to which the stakeholder's demands require immediate attention). However, defining the basis of stakeholder legitimacy is problematic and is typically framed from the perspective of economic rationalism. In the 1960's, environmental organizations or consumer groups opposing corporate actions were not seen by firms as legitimate stakeholders. As these groups grew in power, corporations were forced to take into account their claims to the extent that several such movements were co-opted into the economic rationalism framework. The 'green movement' started out as a grass roots, anti-business movement: today the environmental agenda is set by corporations not environmental organizations.
Thus, one of the tasks of corporations is to prioritize stakeholders based on an analysis of the corporation-stakeholder relationship. Senior managers of corporations determine the salience of stakeholders and those deemed salient tend to receive management attention. Typically, corporations tend to focus on stakeholders with higher levels of power, legitimacy and urgency: the demands of these "definitive" stakeholders (Mitchell et al. 1997 ) normally get the attention of top management. Interestingly, Mitchell et al. (1997) define the group of stakeholders who have urgency and power but "lack" legitimacy as "dangerous stakeholders" and deplore their actions as being "outside the bounds of legitimacy, dangerous both to the stakeholder-manager relationship and to the individuals and entities involved" (p.878). They single out "wildcat strikers" and "coercive environmentalists" as examples of dangerous stakeholders. They feel duty bound to "identify" dangerous stakeholders without "acknowledging" because they "abhor their practices". They argue that by refusing to acknowledge these dangerous stakeholders they are "counteracting terror in all its forms (which) is an effective counteragent in the battle to maintain civility and civilization" (p.878). While these writers should be applauded for their virtuous stand (the very essence of the white-liberal-leftist approach) on their abhorrence of violence, it must be remembered that there are very few theoretical frameworks in organization studies to understand the continuing violence that development and management theories perpetuate on indigenous peoples throughout the world (not to mention the effects of colonial practices of "civilizing" the natives which I have discussed earlier). Their argument is both ill-defined and insidious: there is no attempt to analyze the problematic notion of "legitimacy" (apart from a passing remark that legitimacy is "socially constructed") and the power dynamics involved in setting "bounds of legitimacy".
If we employ the Mitchell (et al., 1997) framework to examine the Jabiluka case, we would define Aboriginal communities as dependent stakeholders (no power, but with legitimacy and urgency) and the environmental organizations opposed to the mine as dangerous stakeholders (no legitimacy, but with some power and urgency). Even if we argue that environmental organizations are legitimate stakeholders, their actions would be deemed "dangerous" by Mitchell et al. (1997) . It is remarkable how closely this stakeholder framework resembles the colonial framework where colonized countries were either made (or positioned) as dependent through the exercise of political, military and economic power or termed "dangerous" and a threat to world stability if any attempt was made to articulate alternative routes to progress and development. In the Jabiluka case, environmental organizations in Australia and overseas have rallied around in support of the Mirrar people and while this meeting of the "dependent" and "dangerous" has raised public awareness and captured corporate and government attention, it remains to be seen whether it has any effect on existing power relations between stakeholders.
The stakeholder framework developed by Mitchell et al, (1997) is particularly problematic for marginalized groups trying to negotiate their survival with corporations and governments. Their example of portraying the African National Congress in South Africa as an "urgent" stakeholder with no "legitimacy given the ruling South African culture and government" is a case in point. The ANC was illegitimate for a ruling elite that had the power to make laws governing legitimacy. Mitchell et al. (1997) claim that the ANC moved from being a "demanding" stakeholder (possessing urgency, but no legitimacy or power) to a "dangerous" one by using coercive power. However, they argue that only by relinquishing coercive power and becoming a "dependent" stakeholder could the ANC achieve success by acquiring the support of more salient stakeholders (such as international investors). Further, they state (with very little evidence) that the worldwide disinvestment movement by stockholders of transnational corporations was a "major force" for the transformation of South Africa and the "legitimacy" of the ANC. The breathtaking arrogance of this position not only denies years of struggle against colonial domination, but also serves to justify the "ruling South African culture and government" as legitimate, a flawed and ahistorical argument that displaces attention from the coercive power used by "legitimate" governments to the coercive power used by ANC in its resistance (the authors are silent on the former but of course, abhor the latter).
If as Mitchell et al. (1997) assert, the stakeholder theory of the firm "holds the key to more effective management and to a more useful, comprehensive theory of the firm in society" (p.880), it might be prudent for marginalized stakeholders to change their locks. That (perceived) integration of stakeholder needs might be an effective tool for a firm to enhance its image is probably true. However, for a critical understanding of stakeholder theory, this approach is unsatisfactory. Effective practices of "managing" stakeholders and research aimed at generating "knowledge" about stakeholders are less systems of truth than products of power applied by corporations, governments and business schools (Knights, 1992) . As Wilmott (1995) points out the establishment of new organization theories are very much the outcome of the historical development of capitalism and create value only for particular people and institutions. The fact that stakeholder management practices of mining companies that are able to negotiate compensation agreements with Aboriginal communities are touted as a "best practice" approach (Howitt, 1998; Katona, 1998 ) is a striking example of how pervasive and dangerous these regimes of truth can be for marginalized stakeholders. A view of the full picture of the consequences of stakeholder theory and practice requires a stepping out of the frame. A more critical examination of stakeholder theory, for instance understanding that stakeholder relations are systematized and controlled by the imperatives of capital accumulation, may produce a very different picture. Notions of power, legitimacy and urgency and the resultant practice of identifying stakeholder salience are contingent on the particularities of nation states, industries, organizations or other institutions (Wilmott, 1995) and in the process of stakeholder integration, either negate alternative practices or assimilate them. As Katona points out:
"..the types of benefits the mining companies are talking about is another form of assimilation for Aboriginal people. And it's assimilation by industry, which is highly questionable. There's already pressure been applied from governments historically over the last 200 years for Aboriginal people, to accommodate a Western system of education, for Aboriginal people to accommodate a Western system of living, and Aboriginal people have resisted that and actively resisted that. And one of the fundamental parts of this campaign for the Mirrar is the fact that their relationship with the land and all the values and beliefs that underpin that, that give them the right to say no is being challenged by this development". It makes little difference to Aboriginal communities whether corporations stakeholder strategies are "reactive", "defensive", "accommodating" or "proactive" (Carroll, 1979) or follow any other typology: the right to say no to development on their land does not arise in any case. Roberts (1981) documented a wide range of strategies used by mining companies in Australia to negotiate mining leases on Aboriginal land. Some of these strategies include (1) ignore Aboriginal land councils wherever possible (or threaten to do so) (2) isolate any Aboriginal group or individual who is a "traditional owner" and focus company efforts in making a deal with them (3) discredit advisers used by Aboriginal groups and any scientific evidence produced by "outsiders" or use the law to restrict access to the land (4) invoke national interest and economic security of Australia (5) offer to employ "employable" Aborigines. Nearly twenty years later, the same strategies are still being used by mining companies: in the Jabiluka case, every single strategy listed above was used at one time or another.
The organization-stakeholder issue in the Jabiluka case is also intertwined with questions about national identity or the dissemination of a particular version of that identity which represents Australia as a progress-ive nation.
According to Phillip Shirvington, CEO of ERA:
"We have to leave the past behind us, we have to try and improve the future together. That's really what it's all about -it's about reconciliation, it's about the two sides coming together, talking about their problems, and moving forward. And that's what we're proposing to do, to meet all the concerns they have and to move ahead together so that the economic benefits which come from development including the mine can be used in a constructive way to suit Aboriginal lifestyles."
The capitalist, colonialist assumption of timespace in its differentiation between a past that needs to be left behind and a future that ensures profit and continuing colonial oppression is well articulated here. Couched in rhetoric that seems to be just, Shirvington's use of the reference to reconciliation 3 is insidious and his persuasion to leave the past behind is in direct contrast to the manner in which indigenous peoples have articulated their resistance to colonialism precisely through their connections to the "past". The past has never been past for indigenous peoples of Australia both in the manner in which their philosophy expresses and cuts through the relationship between Western concepts of past and present, as well as the manner in which the continuing colonial versions of Australian history separate the past from the present in order to relegate colonial oppression to the past thereby disavowing its present manifestations. How economic benefits that arise from the mine can be used in a "constructive way to suit Aboriginal lifestyles" is unclear, especially when we consider that the basis of Aboriginal opposition to the mine was the damage these "economic benefits" caused to their lifestyles as well as the potential environmental dangers the mine poses to their lifestyles. Arguments such as Shirvington's do not recognize that Aboriginal lifestyles stem from "Aboriginal identities that are necessarily formed out of the fissures of resistance to capitalist values and the social encounters that underlie them" (Anderson, 1995, p. 80) and that economic benefits and values of "development" actually undermine Aboriginal values.
Government and corporate rhetoric about the future consequences of mining always highlights its economic benefits. Serious environmental concerns voiced by "outside" environmental scientists and Aboriginal communities in the area have either been ignored or discredited (Christopherson and Langton, 1995) . The Office of the Supervising Scientists was set up by the government as the expert body to monitor the environmental effects of the mine. To "save costs", much of the data was provided by the mining company itself. Despite his own department advising that the mining company's environmental impact study was "deficient in key areas", the Minister for the Environment, Robert Hill decided to reject the Mirrar people's opposition to the mine, saying it would have no impact. The CEO of the mining company, Phillip Shirvington dismissed claims made by the environmental organizations about environmental concerns surrounding the mine as "philosophical". It would be a difficult task to convince the Mirrar people that 65 million tonnes of uranium waste, that will be buried in their land (and that will stay radioactive at least for the next 200,000 years) is "philosophical" but not quite "real".
Another discourse that interlocks with the discourses of economic development and indigenous rights is the environmentalism discourse or more appropriately, the Western Environmentalism discourse. This discourse is based on Western notions of conservation -on a vision of pristine, unspoilt, intact nature and is the driving force behind the creation of "National Parks", a policy designed to protect nature. The problem of course is that indigenous inhabitants of these "parks" are also subsumed into this category of nature and conservation thus denying them the right to determine what direction their future should take (Perera and Pugliese, 1998) . For example, Katona (1998) describes how the formation of Kakadu National Park, where the Jabiluka and Ranger uranium mines are located, required the creation of a Board of Management to run the park. Despite a predominantly Aboriginal membership, the main agenda of operating and managing the park continued to be dictated by non-Aboriginal representatives, in effect locking out traditional owners from using the resources of the Park. Kakadu National Park was created based on a specific relationship between mining, conservation and indigenous rights (Katona, 1998) , where mining acts as a guarantor of conservation and indigenous rights, "even as it sets their limits, and, effectively, ensures their failure" (Perera and Pugliese, 1998, p.75 ). Environmentalism and conservation have failed indigenous peoples throughout the world just as civilization and development did. Colonial practices are also embedded in discourses of Western environmentalism. As Mies and Shiva (1993) argue, the "civilization" phase of colonialism deprived non-western peoples of their rights and resources. The "development" stage had similar effects and the current environmentalism/conservation discourse also involves controlling rights and resources of indigenous peoples.
Implications for Critical Management Studies
In their call for a more critical approach to management studies, Grice and Humphries (1997) argue for a non-managerial position whose purpose is "not performativity but emancipation". Much of current critical work in management focuses on the same questions and tries to provide better answers. As we have seen, even theories of social responsibility despite their emancipatory intent, are avowedly managerialist and does not contribute to a critical understanding of the consequences of managerial decision-making. Changing organizational theorizing needs a different way of thinking that asks new questions rather than obtaining more answers to the same questions. It needs to ask questions from different, often oppositional perspectives, it is constantly suspicious of all answers. It asks why certain questions are asked, why others are not asked, "why some approaches are chosen over others and what interests are included or excluded in this process" (Grice and Humphries, 1997, p.423 ). An overwhelming proportion of research in management focuses on traditional profit-oriented corporations. The bulk of research on not-forprofit organizations is also framed by similar corporate goals: how can we raise more money for charity, how can we get more people into museums or libraries or zoos? There is very little research on strategies for activist groups and organizations, and the theories and practices required to oppose corporate actions (Frooman, 1999) . Contemporary discourses of stakeholder theory either distort its "normative core" for "practical" reasons such as the profit-seeking behavior of corporations (Treviño and Weaver, 1999) . This is the crux of the problem: the normative core of stakeholder theory is based on the norms that emerged within a particular historical context which is the modern capitalist notion of the business corporation operating within an ethical framework based on a Judeo-Christian ethic. These are by no means universal norms and current management theories rather than questioning whose norms are used, tend to normalize conflicting criteria for notions of development and progress.
A critical perspective on stakeholder theory would not just focus on documenting "best practice" in stakeholder management. It would involve examining how knowledge and theory development in the field constitutes social relations between different stakeholders and perhaps even set the ground for a different set of conditions, which in turn needs to be critiqued. It needs to go beyond structuralist notions of cause and effect. Thus, instead of asking the (structuralist) question, what are the general rules governing stakeholder relations determined in relation to other similar relations, the question becomes post-structuralist: what gives this particular person the right (power) to say this? Why this statement and not some other one? Clearly, the poststructuralist question is more historical and less universalizing (Muecke, 1992) . Popular dimensions of organizations that invoke notions such as diffusion, democracy, market, empowerment, flexibility, trust and collectivity, also need to be critically examined and countered by investigating how these corporate objectives along with notions of "values" and "ethics" increasingly dominate all other "social" agendas giving rise to a new corporate colonialism (Goldsmith, 1997; Grice and Humphries, 1997) . Countering positive knowledge is a definite item on the agenda for critical management studies along with an understanding of "how management knowledge results from and contributes to a particular disciplinary regime" (Knights, 1992, p.519) . Developing critical ways of thinking and seeing management theory requires an investigation of forms of domination in other locations than the office or factory workplace, perhaps this will be more effective in initiating revolutionary change (Poster, 1989) .
Critical discourses in management theory are increasingly being located in the larger modernismpostmodernism debate that is currently taking place in the field. A major point of divergence in this debate is the meanings and deployment of terms such as oppression, emancipation and domination which are seen to be anachronistic by several postmodernists (Grice and Humphries, 1997) . Rather than enter the debate at this stage, I choose to point readers to the appropriate writers (see for example, Alvesson, 1995; Clegg (1990); Parker (1992; ; Thompson (1993); Wilmott (1995) for their versions of the debate). I suspect that the war over labels such as "skeptical", "affirmative", "hard", "soft", "ethical", "celebratory" or "reactionary" postmodernisms, is just that: brand labels that academics use to position themselves in the increasingly competitive postmodern market (and also, as Alvesson (1992) suggests, create the potential for redefining prior work and creating a space for new careers). Rather than focus on multichotomous designer postmodern labels, it might be more useful to interchange theoretical insights from different positions in the process of producing a more critical management theory. Much is to be gained from the postmodern position of exposing the fallacies behind rationality and notions of progress. At the same time, it is not good science to shirk from a position of visible political interest: rather a continuous self-reflexivity and assessment of the power dynamics, antecedents and consequences of a particular political position is called for, within the spirit of emancipation.
It is also important to realize however, that much of postmodern theorizing has little relevance (and in fact, can be quite detrimental to) to Aboriginal groups engaged in struggles over their land. The politics of representation and the nexus between interests and identity (despite its "essentialist" overtones) continue to play a crucial role for indigenous struggles throughout the world and no amount of postmodern theorizing is going to change that. Valorizing and celebrating difference is not as relevant to these struggles as is making a difference and despite its disavowal of metanarratives, there is a problem with the way the "post-" in postmodernism can operate in the guise of knowledge. As Radhakrishnan (1994) points out:
"…what gets celebrated in postmodernist thought is the capacity for Eurocentric philosophy to master and own itself even during its periods of dark and menacing crisis, its genius to launch its very negativity in the form of a persuasive philosophy. Its loss of privilege thus recuperated by theory, postmodernism begins to assume the function of a non-organic, free-floating signifier with global epistemic ambitions. If the West is the home of progressive knowledge, and if the West itself has begun to question its own knowledge then, clearly knowledge itself must be in universal jeopardy. And who else to the rescue but the western subject all over again who can convert loss of authority into a pure theory of subject-less knowledge" (p. 313).
Conclusion and Future Possibilities
I began this paper by discussing colonial relations in a postcolonial era and some of the problems associated with the deployment of the term "post-". And yet, I recognize the importance of critiquing these spaces from within in order to participate in the transformation of colonial relations of power within which indigenous peoples have been and continue to be historical subjects and agents of an oppositional discourse. This position recognizes the danger in speaking from a site where the discipline of postcolonialism speaks the postcolonial critic. Perhaps it may be appropriate to conclude by discussing some emancipatory possibilities of the term.
One approach is to deconstruct the "post-" by clarifying and expanding on the reminders of colonialism and experiences of colonialism that continue into the present. Said (1986) believes this should be the role of the postcolonial intellectual. Rather than isolate colonialism as a distinct historical period with little claim on the present, it is the postcolonial intellectual's role to "look for discontinuities in apparently smooth surfaces and for continuities across the dominant and oppositional" (Mani, 1989, p.13) . A deconstructive critique of nationalism that serves to locate such discontinuities and expose the complicity of national interests with colonial and capitalist discourses also becomes an imperative (Chatterjee, 1986) . Modernity, progress, development are all hallmarks of the nationalistic project of the postcolonial era and too often serves as continuities of colonial modes of control.
The question of agency is another important issue. While postmodernist theories have produced critiques of the modernist conception of agency, alternative formulations are yet to be produced (Mani, 1989) . Colonial transformation requires a strong sense of agency and despite the inadequacies of sophisticated theorizing, current resistances and struggles against colonial forms of power continue to take place in different parts of the world. Radhakrishnan (1993) sees the politics of solidarity as being as important as the politics of representation that underlie these struggles. He calls for an "allegorization of the postcolonial condition" (p.767) and the creation of a space that relates heterogenous struggles without normalizing them so as to "authenticate their awareness of themselves as a form of political knowledge". This is probably a better strategy than to be what Sara Suleri (1989) calls an "otherness machine" where the production and distribution of alterity is the principle role of the postcolonial intellectual (Appiah, 1991) .
Recognition of "otherness" should not stop with a recognition of other histories but should recognize them as other knowledges that question the legitimacy and power of Western knowledge systems (Radhakrishnan, 1994) . Studies of Aboriginal resistance are also theorized in relation to Western cultures and the dichotomies that result from this position (development versus no development; traditional versus modern; land use versus conservation) only serve to perpetuate Western notions of progress. Relocating and reinscribing resistance from the cultures they spring from is by itself another form of resistance, probably more empowering (Escobar, 1995) . This is where, according to Katona (1998) , academia has failed Aboriginal communities. Courses on cross-cultural understanding and cultural sensitivity developed by universities and schools seem to benefit non-Aboriginal communities. The focus of much academic research today is what Katona (1998) calls "academic skull measuring", where one portion of non-Aboriginal society tries to understand more about Aboriginal communities and once the communities are analyzed, subjectified and reconstituted, the task is done and the research over with no value to Aboriginal communities who are the subjects of the research. Katona (1998) calls for efforts to demystify the dominant paradigm for indigenous communities so that they can take advantage of aspects of western society that benefits their way of life, aspects that provide for their rights and can be used to negotiate the forms of their existence.
Katona's argument is also related to the notion of Aboriginal self-determination. The Australian Government's definition of self-determination as "Aboriginal communities deciding the pace and nature of their future development as significant components within a diverse Australia" (Roberts, 1994, p.259 ) is a constraining one and limits notions of self-determination to those areas which are compatible with the interests of the nation state, a position that is untenable to several Aboriginal communities. Political options such as self-government and sovereignty are automatically ruled out. Within the nation state apparatus, negotiating the conditions of existence involves negotiations for authority, negotiations for resources and control (Reynolds, 1994) and this requires a fundamental restructuring of power relations. Self-determination also involves autonomy over how Aboriginal peoples are represented and the challenge is to "construct their own social and cultural models in ways not so mediated by a Western episteme and historicity -albeit in an increasingly transnational context" (Mudimbe 1988, p.183 ). If such a task is impossible, if it is impossible to step out of the pages of Western history and epistemology, it is still possible to try and turn the pages in a certain way.
The diversity of social movements in different parts of the world might provide such an alternative reading guide that could transform hegemonic notions of development and modernity (Escobar, 1992) . The study of "traditional ecological knowledge" is becoming increasingly in vogue for Western scientists and pharmaceutical corporations. It is crucial to examine this practice with a critical lens in order to understand the stakes involved: who is doing the study and for what purpose? Understanding and using traditional ecological knowledge of indigenous peoples for the advancement of Western science and medicine through patents and intellectual property rights is simply another violation of indigenous rights. If we have to search for alternatives to development, apart from a critique of contemporary notions of development we also need to situate our theories within appropriate social movements: for example, traditional ecological knowledge should not be separated from the political, economic and cultural struggles of indigenous peoples (Carruthers, 1996) . Aboriginal struggle for land rights is more than a fight to regain their land, as Escobar (1995) points out, "it is above all a struggle over symbols and meanings, a cultural struggle" (p.248). The Jabiluka struggle is such a struggle. It is not a postcolonial struggle, it is an anti-colonial struggle. As Perera and Pugliese (1994) assert, if our critical theories, our postmodern theories, our postcolonial theories are to have any meaning, their "genuinely transformative aspirations (should) be identified by its commitment to vital local struggles, as also by its openness to reexamining its own disciplinary premises, orthodoxies and complicities" (p.98).
Perhaps, the words of Jacqui Katona and Yvonne Margarula provide a fitting conclusion to this paper and a reminder of what is still left to be done: Katona:
"We had a discussion about this with people. What if we don't win the court case or what if we aren't able to influence the government? And a senior man stopped the discussion.. and he said look, win or lose, it doesn't matter. What is important is that we fight, that we fight for our beliefs, we fight for the things that are important to us".
Yvonne:
"I believe my own culture. Black fella way. Right way. Proper way. Bining way. Balanda should listen. And believe. How many times we gonna tell him?"
